# UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

ALBERT PARKER,

Plaintiff,

v.

CAMDEN COUNTY
CORRECTIONAL FACILITY
and WARDEN DAVID S. OWENS,

Defendants.

HONORABLE JEROME B. SIMANDLE

Civil Action
No. 16-cv-06929 (JBS-AMD)

OPINION

#### APPEARANCES:

Albert Parker, Plaintiff Pro Se 1533 Route 38, Room 229 Lumberton, NJ 08060

#### SIMANDLE, Chief District Judge:

### I. <u>INTRODUCTION</u>

Plaintiff Albert Parker seeks to bring a civil rights complaint against Camden County Correctional Facility ("CCCF") and Warden David S. Owens ("Owens") (collectively, "Defendants") pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for allegedly unconstitutional conditions of confinement. Complaint, Docket Entry 1.

28 U.S.C. 1915(e)(2) requires a court to review complaints prior to service in cases in which a plaintiff is proceeding in forma pauperis. The Court must sua sponte dismiss any claim that is frivolous, is malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. This action is subject to sua

sponte screening for dismissal under Section 1915(e)(2)(B) because Plaintiff is proceeding in forma pauperis.

For the reasons set forth below, the Court will dismiss the Complaint with prejudice for failure to state a claim. 28 U.S.C. \$ 1915(e)(2)(b)(ii).

### II. BACKGROUND

Plaintiff's Complaint states: "I was forced to live in inhumane conditions while incarcerated. Forced to sleep on cell floors by a toilet getting urine on my mattress and clothing and sheets. I was unable [sic] to wash my soiled clothing only once a week causing skin breakouts. Sleeping on a thin mattress on concrete left me with consistent back pain. I was forced to shower in fungus filled showers." Complaint § III(C).

Plaintiff states that the alleged events giving rise to these claims occurred: "June 2011." Id. § III(B).

With respect to alleged injuries from these events,

Plaintiff states: "Back neck rashes. [T]his [is] why I collect

di[s]ability." Id. § IV.

Plaintiff seeks \$5,000 in relief. Id. § V.

# III. STANDARD OF REVIEW

To survive *sua sponte* screening under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) for failure to state a claim, a complaint must allege "sufficient factual matter" to show that the claim is facially plausible. *Fowler v. UPMS Shadyside*, 578 F.3d 203, 210 (3d Cir.

2009) (citation omitted). "A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Fair Wind Sailing, Inc. v. Dempster, 764 F.3d 303, 308 n.3 (3d Cir. 2014). "[A] pleading that offers 'labels or conclusions' or 'a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.'" Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)).

#### IV. DISCUSSION

Plaintiff asserts claims against Defendants for allegedly unconstitutional conditions of confinement. This Court must dismiss the Complaint with prejudice for failure to state a claim. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(b)(ii).

(A) First, the Complaint must be dismissed because: (1)

CCCF is not a "state actor" within the meaning of § 1983. See,
e.g., Grabow v. Southern State Corr. Facility, 726 F. Supp. 537,
538-39 (D.N.J. 1989) (correctional facility is not a "person"

under § 1983); and (2) Plaintiff has "[not] alleged any personal
involvement by [Owens] in any constitutional violation - a fatal
flaw, since 'liability in a § 1983 suit cannot be predicated
solely on the operation of respondent superior.'" Baker v.

Flagg, 439 F. App'x 82, 84 (3d Cir. 2011) (citing Rode v.

Dellarciprete, 845 F.2d 1195, 1207 (3d Cir. 1988)).

"[Plaintiff's] complaint contains no allegations regarding [the] Warden. 'Because vicarious liability is inapplicable to § 1983 suits, a plaintiff must plead that each Government-official defendant, through the official's own individual actions, has violated the Constitution.' Thus, [plaintiff] failed to state a claim against [the] Warden." Bob v. Kuo, 387 F. App'x 134, 136 (3d Cir. 2010) (citing Ashcroft, 556 U.S. at 676).

Accordingly, Plaintiff's claims against CCCF and Owens must be dismissed.

(B) Second, "plaintiffs who file complaints subject to dismissal should receive leave to amend unless amendment would be inequitable under [§ 1915] or futile." Grayson v. Mayview State Hosp., 293 F.3d 103, 114 (3d Cir. 2002). This Court denies leave to amend at this time as Plaintiff's Complaint is barred by the statute of limitations, which is governed by New Jersey's two-year limitations period for personal injury. See Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 276 (1985); Dique v. N.J. State Police, 603 F.3d 181, 185 (3d Cir. 2010). The accrual date of a § 1983 action is determined by federal law, however. Wallace v. Kato,

<sup>&</sup>quot;Although the running of the statute of limitations is ordinarily an affirmative defense, where that defense is obvious from the face of the complaint and no development of the record is necessary, a court may dismiss a time-barred complaint sua sponte under § 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) for failure to state a claim." Ostuni v. Wa Wa's Mart, 532 F. App'x 110, 111-12 (3d Cir. 2013) (per curiam).

549 U.S. 384, 388 (2007); Montanez v. Sec'y Pa. Dep't of Corr.,
773 F.3d 472, 480 (3d Cir. 2014). "Under federal law, a cause of
action accrues when the plaintiff knew or should have known of
the injury upon which the action is based." Montanez, 773 F.3d
at 480 (internal quotation marks omitted).

Plaintiff states that the alleged events giving rise to his claims occurred: "June 2011." Complaint § III(B). The allegedly unconstitutional conditions of confinement would have been immediately apparent to Plaintiff at the time of detention.

Accordingly, the statute of limitations for Plaintiff's claims expired in June 2013. As there are no grounds for equitable tolling of the statute of limitations, the Complaint will be dismissed with prejudice. Ostuni v. Wa Wa's Mart, 532 F. App'x 110, 112 (3d Cir. 2013) (per curiam) (affirming dismissal with prejudice due to expiration of statute of limitations).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> Equitable tolling "is only appropriate '(1) where the defendant has actively misled the plaintiff respecting the plaintiff's cause of action; (2) where the plaintiff in some extraordinary way has been prevented from asserting his or her rights; or (3) where the plaintiff has timely asserted his or her rights mistakenly in the wrong forum.'" Omar v. Blackman, 590 F. App'x 162, 166 (3d Cir. 2014) (quoting Santos ex rel. Beato v. United States, 559 F.3d 189, 197 (3d Cir. 2009)).

## V. CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above, the Complaint is dismissed with prejudice for failure to state a claim.

An appropriate order follows.

February 7, 2017s/ Jerome B. SimandleDateJEROME B. SIMANDLEChief U.S. District Judge